Did the Abhisit government "overreact" to the ostentatious challenge posed by Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen?
To answer that seemingly simple question, however, an assumption must be established. We have to agree that we need to look beyond the surface of the argument cited by all sides and dig deeper into their motives in order to understand the actions or judge them.
What is Mr Hun Sen's desire? In other words, what is the "endgame" he had in mind before he embarked on this diplomatic brinkmanship?
There is no doubt that Mr Hun Sen sees an advantage in escalating the few topics of latent tension between Thailand and Cambodia to the point that the international community's involvement might be justified. As a smaller, poorer country, one that has experienced the horrors of genocide, Cambodia will always garner more sympathy than Thailand, regardless of the nature of the dispute.
A Thai national may find this diplomatic note hard to stomach, but it is a reality, one which we have no choice but to operate in.
How could Mr Hun Sen make the dormant issues of contention - the overlapping areas at Preah Vihear and in the sea - flare up without a physical act of aggression from the Cambodian side? How could he stir up Bangkok's anger and prod it into retaliating?
He started with verbal challenges such as the one about "shooting any Thai who trespasses" into the claimed overlapping area. But that did not work. The Abhisit government did not take the bait. It took the provocation in its stride.
Mr Hun Sen then upped the ante with the use of a proxy to further poke the Abhisit government. The enemy of an enemy is a friend, right? Thaksin Shinawatra fits the bill perfectly. With his heart intent on getting back to power, the ex-PM would be willing to do anything to snub the current government and to ultimately bring it down. Once the interests were aligned, an alliance was formed. And Mr Hun Sen finally got the ferocious reaction he so wanted from Bangkok.
Some pundits argue that by using Thaksin as a Trojan Horse, Mr Hun Sen is banking heavily on the former PM's ability to come back and rule. I would say it would not hurt Mr Hun Sen if Thaksin found his way back to power. But if not, if Thaksin should stumble along the way, Mr Hun Sen has nothing to lose, either. His immediate goal is to make Thailand look bad in the eyes of international observers. Whether this is good or bad, right or wrong, that goal has been met. The future is up for bargaining.
Viewed in this light, it is predictable that so long as Mr Hun Sen needs to depict his country as a victim of bullying by Thailand, he will continue to shower his affection on Thaksin in the hope that the Abhisit government will retaliate more severely. In a sense, the more Thai-Cambodian relations deteriorate, the better the prospects Cambodia will have when it comes to negotiating clout in every pending case, especially if members of the international community are allowed to get involved.
So back to the original question: did the Abhisit government overreact to the insult by Cambodia's head of government?
I personally do not think so. I believe the formal ties between the two countries have been held as a surety to the leadership. And they often end up as collateral damage anyway. This case is no exception.
Considering the circumstances - the needs of PM Hun Sen, the baggage of PM Abhisit and the passion of former PM Thaksin - it was almost inevitable that these factors would come together and to a head, if not in this way then in another, equally troublesome manner.
To put it in other words, Thai-Cambodian ties are set to suffer anyway.
The problem, however, is how to proceed from here? While Mr Hun Sen might want to raise the tension up another level and Thaksin would happily lend a hand, PM Abhisit had better keep the situation at least at a stalemate.
So, if Thaksin shows up in Phnom Penh today, PM Abhisit's best move would be to take the higher ground and only press upon the extradition obligation.
After all, Mr Hun Sen has done nothing wrong in asking Thaksin to be his adviser. He only overstepped the line when he formally declared that he would not extradite the convicted former PM.
As for Thaksin, there is no need to emphasise the conflict of interest in his accepting to serve as the neighbouring country's adviser. For if he knew the meaning of that phrase, he would not have been convicted in the first place.
- Atiya Achakulwisut is Editorial Pages Editor, Bangkok Post.
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